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Abstract 
Despite widespread interest in corruption and how to root it out, the problem continues to 
grow. Anti-corruption strategies and methods have proved ineffective in achieving lasting 
reductions in corruption. Anti-corruption academic research has not been free of criticism, 
and part of the problem is its emphasis on macro-level analysis. The case studies in 
corruption and anti-corruption in this Symposium focus on specific areas that have received 
surprisingly little attention in the literature: the effectiveness of political finance supervisory 
bodies; the impact of European Union post-conditionality on anti-corruption efforts; and the 
increased use of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in shaping the way that corruption 
is conceptualised and combated on a global scale. Together, the articles in this Symposium 
offer some novel insights and approaches to the issue of how best to understand and assess 
different ways of addressing corruption in specific sectors which have received insufficient 
attention in the literature to date. 
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There has been no shortage of academic research on the topic of corruption, with new books 
and articles being published on a seemingly never-ending basis.  Yet, for all the interest in the 
issue and how to root it out – not just from academics, but also policy makers, international 
financial organisations, dedicated anti-corruption agencies, civil society organisations, 
investigative journalists – it appears that the problem of corruption continues to grow, 
reflected in ever more protests around the globe against venal politicians and public officials. 
The other side of the coin of this seemingly inexorable trend is the persistent difficulty in 
formulating effective anti-corruption strategies and methods which are not either resisted or 
ineffective in their implementation and effect. As Johnston (2014: 1) points out, whilst the 
anti-corruption movement enjoys broad support and can claim results in terms of better 
analysis of the problem and increasing public awareness about it, ‘lasting reductions in 
corruption have been elusive’, especially in areas where it is needed most.  
 Mark Pyman (2017), a long-term anti-corruption practitioner who has been closely 
involved in the work of Transparency International and was until recently one of three 
international members of the independent Anti-Corruption Commission in Afghanistan, has 
bemoaned the ‘unhelpful nature of anti-corruption research’, observing plaintively that 
‘[s]urely, researchers know more than just how to explain the problem?’  Against Pyman, it 
might be argued that we cannot address a problem until we fully understand it – and, for all 
the efforts dedicated both to analysing and combating corruption over recent decades, there 
remain core questions that we are not yet able to answer satisfactorily.  Amongst these, 
surprisingly enough, is what we even mean by the term ‘corruption’: despite the widespread 
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use of the formulation that it is ‘the abuse of power for private gain’, or some close variant 
thereon, such a definition can encompass so many different forms of activity that it is 
unhelpful as a guide to practical action. 
The three articles in this symposium do not seek to address the fundamental question 
of what we mean by corruption, nor do they offer practical guidelines for how best to combat 
it – in whatever guise it happens to take.  Instead, they seek to focus on areas that have 
received surprisingly little attention in the extensive literature on corruption since it emerged 
as a ‘global issue’ in the mid-1990s.  The significance of their contributions lies in a 
combination of suggestions for new approaches to analysing corruption and attention to 
issues that have largely been ignored in existing studies, offering a basis to further our 
understanding of what might and might not work in attempting to reduce the spread of 
corruption.  In that sense, they should also be of potential value to anti-corruption 
practitioners. 
One of the articles seeks to assess the impact of specific measures or interventions.  In 
an innovative analysis, Luís de Sousa (2018) develops a framework for gauging the 
effectiveness of political financing supervisory bodies (PFSBs), specialised agencies charged 
with overseeing the implementation of rules relating to party and campaign financing.  As he  
shows, the number of these bodies has grown significantly during the past two decades, 
although they vary in their precise format and functions.  Placing particular emphasis on 
PFSBs in six European states (France, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia and the United 
Kingdom), de Sousa develops an index of enforcement capacity to explore how effective 
these bodies are in practice.  His analysis demonstrates significant differences in detection, 
disciplinary and preventive powers across the six cases and highlights the need for a more 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between the institutional forms of PFSBs and other 
enabling factors that can help them achieve their ends. 
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In an article that looks at the impact of European Union post-conditionality on anti-
corruption efforts, Gabriela Borz (2018) utilises a stimulus-response model to assess their 
effectiveness in Bulgaria and Romania.  Focusing on the continued impact of 
recommendations tied to the EU accession of these two countries in 2007, as well as the long-
standing work of the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO)1, Borz makes an 
argument for the potential efficacy of so-called ‘soft governance’.  She suggests that, contrary 
to some existing assumptions that external recommendations and criticisms are not helpful in 
reducing corruption, if they are supported by internal commitments – especially when 
reinforced by civil society pressure – they can indeed have a positive impact.  Borz argues 
that national responses, triggered by the actions of the EU in setting out conditionality 
requirements, helps explain why apparent back-sliding appeared greater in Bulgaria than in 
Romania.  It could be argued that her emphasis on the importance of civic engagement finds 
some support in the mass protests in Romania in early 2017 (the biggest since 1989) that 
forced the government to drop plans to soften the definition of abuse of power and agree to a 
national referendum on fighting official corruption2 -- although no date was set for it.  
Moreover, parliamentary bills seen as weakening anti-corruption efforts prompted further 
protests in early 2018.3  None the less, the future anti-corruption trajectory of these two states 
will provide an important test of the EU’s capacity to continue to exert meaningful influence. 
A shift of geographical focus can be found in the article by Ellen Gutterman (2018),  
that looks at the increased use of the path-breaking US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act4 
(FCPA) and how it has helped to shape the way that corruption is conceptualised and 
combated on a global scale.  Gutterman provides a clear account of how the FCPA, first 
introduced in 1977 and amended in 1988 and again in 1998, has been increasingly enforced 
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
with its focus extending well beyond US national boundaries.  Some of the cases prosecuted, 
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such as that involving the French firm Total SA in 2013, have involved only the most tenuous 
links with the USA’s national jurisdiction.  A key insight of Gutterman’s analysis is that the 
dramtically increased enforcement of the FCPA may be contributing to undermining the 
broader anti-corruption agenda.  Three reasons account for this: first, the very narrow 
understanding of corruption encompassed within the FCPA, which is effectively restricted to 
transactional bribery; second, a focus on US strategic trade issues rather than explicitly anti-
corruption concerns in the way is has been enforced; and, third, its potential threat to 
legitimacy through both the normative principles upon which it rests and a lack of 
accountability mechanisms to challenge its conception of how the global enforcement of anti-
corruption should be managed.   These are telling arguments, that chime with growing 
concern about so-called ‘governance by indicators’ (Cooley and Snyder 2016;  Engle Merry, 
Davis. and Kingsbury 2015;  Davis, Fisher, Kingsbury and Engle Merry 2012).   
Taken together, the articles in this symposium offer some novel insights and 
approaches to the issue of how best to understand and assess different ways of addressing 
corruption.  They do not seek to offer all-encompassing or overarching theories, but instead 
focus on specific factors or sectors, be those specialised agencies, regulatory frameworks or 
other initiatives.  Too much work on corruption to date has focused on macro-level analysis, 
seeking to use some inadequately specified understanding of the concept to serve usually as a 
dependent variable explained by a host of ‘structural’ factors (GDP, institutional 
shortcomings, regulatory frameworks, and so forth) that are usually pitched at the level of the 
nation state.  Whilst such work has helped us to understand broad patterns of corrupt practice, 
and where it is most deeply embedded, it is less helpful for identifying what to do about it.  If 
a key driver of levels of corruption is geographical location, for instance, there is not much 
that can be done about that.  More useful, therefore, is to ask questions about what can be 
done, and at what kind of level.  That means moving away from macro-level analyses and 
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narrowing down to more specific, or granular, questions.  The articles here seek to do just 
that in various ways, and thereby provide us with a better understanding of specific aspects 
and dimensions of what can appropriately be described as a ‘wicked problem’ (Rittel and 
Webber 1973: 155). 
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